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Abstract—The lack of stability is one of the major limitations
that constrains Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) from being
put in widespread practical use. In this paper, we propose a
weak PUF and a strong PUF that are both completely stable
with 0% intra-distance. These PUFs are called Locally Enhanced
Defectivity Physical Unclonable Function (LEDPUF). The source
of randomness of a LEDPUF is extracted from locally enhance
defectivity without affecting other parts of the chip. A LEDPUF
is a pure functional PUF that does not require helper data, fuzzy
comparator, or any kinds of correction schemes as conventional
parametric PUFs do. A weak LEDPUF is constructed by forming
arrays of Directed Self Assembly (DSA) random connections is
presented, and the strong LEDPUF is implemented by using the
weak LEDPUF as the key of a keyed-hash message authentication
code (HMAC). Our simulation and statistical results show that
the entropy of the weak LEDPUF bits is close to ideal, and the
inter-distances of both weak and strong LEDPUFs are about
50%, which means that these LEDPUFs are not only stable but
also unique.
We develop a new unified framework for evaluating the level
of security of PUFs, based on password security, by using
information theoretic tools of guesswork. The guesswork model
allows to quantitatively compare, with a single unified metric,
PUFs with varying levels of stability, bias and available side
information. In addition, it generalizes other measures to evaluate
the security level such as min-entropy and mutual information.
We evaluate guesswork-based security of some measured SRAM
and Ring Oscillator PUFs as an example and compare them with
LEDPUF to show that stability has a more severe impact on the
PUF security than biased responses. Furthermore, we find the
guesswork of three new problems: Guesswork under probability
of attack failure, the guesswork of idealized version of a message
authentication code, and the guesswork of strong PUFs that are
used for authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a small piece of
circuitry such that its behavior, or Challenge Response Pair
(CRP) [1], is uniquely defined and it is hard to be predicted and
replicated because of the intrinsic random physical nature and
the uncontrollability of process variations. As a security prim-
itive, PUF can enable low overhead hardware identification,
tracing, and authentication during the global manufacturing
chain. The first PUF was introduced more than a decade ago
[2]. Since then, many silicon PUF implementations have been
proposed, such as Arbiter PUF [3], Ring Oscillator (RO) PUF
[4], SRAM PUF [5], and many other variations.
Since the key commonality between all current silicon PUF
implementations is their use of parametric manufacturing
variations, two of the most challenging design tasks a PUF
designer will encounter are :
1) How to make the PUF unique and stable even under
extreme conditions without expensive implementation
cost?
This work was supported in part by NSF grants 1136174 and 1321120.
2) How to evaluate the security level of a PUF given its
uniqueness and stability measurements?
A. Limitations of Parametric PUFs
1) Random Local Variation Extraction: One of the major
concerns of parametric PUFs is that local variation should be
the only entropy source for these PUFs [6]. However, from
our experiments on a large silicon data set [7], only 13% of
total variation is random local variation, which means that
most variation is coming from global or spatial variation. Any
attempt to use global or spatial variation as the source of
randomness can make them vulnerable to a class of process
side channel attacks. For instance, two PUFs on the same
(X,Y) location on different wafers are highly correlated (due
to large wafer-level systematics present in most modern fab-
rication processes). As a result, a few sacrificial wafers can
aid in developing a relatively straightforward side channel
attack. We tested this side channel attack on silicon RO PUF
measurements in 65nm technology across 300 wafers. Figure
1 shows that the inter-distance [6] on the same (X,Y) is much
smaller than the inter-distance across all PUFs. Therefore,
an adversary with possession of a reference PUF, which is
fabricated at the same (X,Y) location as the target PUF, would
have a higher probability of guessing the correct answer than
random guessing. The radial nature of systematic across wafer
variation [7] means that just a few reference PUFs drawn
carefully may be sufficient for attackers instead of keeping
full sacrificial wafers.
Fig. 1. The inter-distance of PUFs from same (X,Y) location on different
wafers is much smaller than that of across all PUFs, which demonstrates a
possible side channel attack.
2) Measurement Noise: Measurement noise could be an-
other big issue for parametric PUFs and needs to be carefully
compensated. For instance, metastability of the arbiter circuit
for Arbiter PUFs and accumulated jitter in RO PUFs can be
sources of measurement noises. For weak PUF measurement,
we evaluate the intra-distance [6] of SRAM PUFs using fifteen
commercial 45nm SOI test chips, where each consists 176kB
data memory. The power-up state is measured 10 times during
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an 8-hour period, and the mean of intra-distance distribution is
2.57%. Since the experiment is done in room temperature with
exactly same settings, the difference is essentially contributed
by the measurement noise.
3) Environmental fluctuations and wearout: Existing sili-
con PUFs are in nature susceptible to environmental fluctua-
tions [8] and wearout [9]. To account for the instability issue,
techniques such as error correction code (ECC), helper data or
fuzzy comparator must be applied. A possible worst case sce-
nario is when the environmental factors change significantly
but yet remain constant. For instance, the PUF is enrolled at
20°C and is verified at 80°C. In this case, a fuzzy extraction
process may not be able to recover the initial PUF response,
even for multiple samples of the PUF.
B. Techniques to Improve Parametric PUF Quality
A variety of techniques have been intensively studied over
the years to extract random local variations or to make a
PUF more stable and reliable. A Non-Volatile Memory (NVM)
based PUF without helper data is presented in [10]. However,
besides its hardware and calibration overhead, the results of
uniqueness and entropy analysis are also missing. In [11],
the local randomness is distilled by modeling and subtracting
the systematic variation. A similar technique is to subtract
the averaged frequency from multiple measurements to reveal
the true local random variation [12]. However, the calculation
and information storage requirement come with the cost of
addition latency and hardware. Taking the majority vote [13]
or finding stable responses [14] are possible techniques to
eliminate the measurement noise, however, at the cost of large
latency or reduced number of challenges. Other complex im-
plementations have been proposed to mitigate stability issues
that often induce lower hardware efficiency [6], additional
circuit complexity [15], or making the PUF more susceptible
to attacks [16]. Also, to protect PUFs from the worst case
scenario as described creates a huge overhead as it requires to
employ very strong ECC [17].
C. Quantifiable Security Evaluation Model
In order to impersonate the hardware, the PUF attacker
needs to respond to a challenge with a correct response (i.e.,
guess a secret). Comprehensive security models for PUFs
are described in [18], including a precise identification of
required PUF properties, such as indistinguishably and tamper-
resilience. Though this specifies the security requirements, as
a “checklist”, we believe that a more quantitative assessment
of PUF security can be valuable for both PUF designers and
PUF users. Inter- and intra- fractional Hamming Distance
(FHD) [6], and other statistical tests for randomness [19],
have been used for quantifying PUF security. Though it is
reasonable that having larger inter-FHD is more secure, it
does not tell the PUF designer how much more secure it is.
For example, is it worth raising the inter-FHD from 40% to
49% at a cost of extra hardware? In this work we present a
more principled way to analyze PUF security by connecting
it to how one could evaluate password security, through a
guesswork framework. We derive a theoretical framework for
PUF security evaluation that brings together two important
properties of existing PUFs: predictability and reproducibility
[20]. This framework enables a unified security quantification
of several effects including bias, noise, and side-channels on
PUFs, as well as the security over multiple challenge-response
pairs, providing design guidance by quantifying the security
level of a PUF.
One can think of PUF signatures like passwords, and its
breakability should be evaluated by how strong it is, for
example, how many attempts (on average) does it take to
compromise it. This guessing framework has been studied in
the information theory literature and has recently been adopted
by NIST as a measure of password security [21]. We bring this
framework to evaluating the security of PUFs.
D. The LEDPUF
The issues of parametric PUFs, such as the described insta-
bility, wearout, measurement noise, limited local variation, and
limited side channel attack resiliency, clearly motivate the need
to design PUFs that do not rely on parametric performance
variations as the entropy source.
Rather than comparing parameter deviations, the response
of an LEDPUF is stability-guaranteed because it depends on
the local randomness enhanced through locally manipulated
physical layout designs. We leverage intrinsic randomness
in fabrication processes to generate hard defects, such as
random permanent connections generated in Directed Self
Assembly (DSA) process, which is highly compatible with
CMOS technology and is expected to be used in manufacturing
in the near future [22].
Compared to similar parametric PUFs such as hardware
obfuscation [23] or digital PUFs [24], LEDPUF is completely
stable and less susceptible to side channel attacks or model
building attacks. The proposed LEDPUF is also a functional
PUF where logic function itself is the signature and the
strong LEDPUF can generate a variety of challenge-response
pairs as needed. The Boolean nature of the response without
any parametric dependence means that LEDPUF is not only
immune to measurement noise and wearout, but also offers a
greater level of reliability compared to existing PUFs as the
output is resistant to changes in the environmental factors.
E. The Contributions of this Paper
The contributions of this paper are:
• The first stability-guaranteed silicon PUF through locally
enhanced defectivity is proposed.
• Detailed constructions of the weak and strong LEDPUF
using random DSA connections are presented. LEDPUF
is the first PUF with 0% intra-distance without using any
stability enhancement techniques.
• We present a new unified framework for evaluating the
level of security of PUFs through guesswork analysis.
This framework enables us to evaluate and quantify the
effect of noise, bias and model attacks on the level
of security. We also relate guesswork to other security
measures such as min-entropy, and mutual information.
The model quantitatively measures the security of various
PUFs under different scenarios, and by doing so enables
us to compare the security level of different sorts of PUFs.
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• Security of noisy SRAM PUF and RO PUF implemented
on real chips and Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FP-
GAs) are compared with a stable LEDPUF based on the
new model.
• Guesswork is derived for three new problems: Guesswork
under probability of attack failure; the guesswork of
strong PUFs under model building attacks; and the guess-
work of an idealized version of a message authentication
code.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, we describe the local randomness extraction from DSA. In
Section III, the structure of the stable signal unit (SSU) is first
described, followed by the construction of the proposed weak
LEDPUF from the SSU. The unified guesswork framework is
presented in Section IV. In Section V, the evaluation results
of weak LEDPUF and nosiy weak PUFs are presented along
with a derivation of the guesswork under probability of attack
failure. The construction of strong LEDPUF, evaluation of its
security, as well as a derivation of the guesswork of message
authentication codes is presented in Section VI. Finally, we
conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. DSA RANDOMNESS EXTRACTION
We propose DSA as one of the sources of stable randomness
for LEDPUF. DSA is a mechanism by which immiscible block
copolymers (BCP) phase-separate into certain structures [25].
The guiding templates, which are used to guide the self-
assembly process [26], can be lithographically-printed trenches
(Graphoepitaxy) or chemically-treated surfaces (Chemoepi-
taxy). Once a guiding template is printed, its surface is spin-
coated with the BCP solution. The phase separation occurs
during the thermal annealing where thermal equilibrium is
achieved when the free energy is minimized. With a particular
BCP and surface treatment of substrate [27], cylinders are
formed of one block in a matrix of the other block [28].
Since the minimum energy state strongly depends on the
level of confinement achieved by the layout of guiding tem-
plates, for bigger-sized templates, it becomes energetically less
expensive to induce a defect than to achieve a defect-free
energy minimization [29–31]. Therefore, final assembly results
can be random by designing guiding templates that are large
enough to cause random assembly errors even if there are no
lithographic variations [32]. Figure 2 shows three simulation
results of the same large guiding template with an existing
DSA simulator [33], where the model of the PS-b-PMMA
copolymer has been validated in [34]. The three layers inside
the polygonal guiding template are the top, middle, and bottom
layers of a via. If a cylindrical via hole is formed correctly,
the three layers should be three overlapped concentric circles.
However, for the large guiding template, random arrangement
with different orientations begin to occur. In other words, the
randomness of DSA is confined within predetermined local
areas only by deliberately designing ”bad” guiding templates.
A. Hard Defective Connection Formation
We leverage the randomness extracted from DSA to form
randomly assembled connections, and these connections are
then used to fabricate LEDPUF. Though in conventional DSA,
Fig. 2. Random via formations with a same large guiding template.
the goal of the guiding template design is to achieve high
confinement and avoid regions of random phase transitions, we
use the same theory but to enhance randomness in assembly.
To construct a DSA random hard defective connection, we
configure the size of the guiding template so that two vias
are formed with a certain probability that they are connected
permanently. A DSA hard defective connection is composed
of the two vias along with the connection.
In our experiment, each simulation contains three guiding
templates with a same shape, and two vias are formed in each
of the guiding template. If the via pair in a same guiding
template is merged, the DSA hard defective connection is in
closed state; otherwise, the connection is in opened state. In
our statistical analysis, an open state is represented by a logic
“1”, and a closed state is represented by a logic “0”. 500
simulation were performed in our experiments, so 1500 bits
of raw data is obtained from the simulation. Based on our
simulated data, the empirical entropy of triples of bits is only
0.0063 bits smaller than the entropy of independent triple of
bits, which implies that the states of the three connections in a
simulation is independent with each other as expected in real
DSA process [34]. Examples of a simulation result in 2D and
3D views are shown in Figure 3 (a) and (b), respectively. In
the 2D view, the rectangular shapes with rounding corners are
the guiding templates, and the shapes inside of the guiding
templates are the vias. If the via pair in a same guiding
template is merged, the DSA hard defective connection is
formed as shown in Figure 3 (c), and it is in permanent
closed state; otherwise, the DSA hard defective connection is
in permanent opened state as shown in Figure 3 (d). In Figure
3 (a) and (b), two hard defective connections are in opened
state, and one connection is in closed state.
Fig. 3. (a) 2D view of 3 DSA hard defective connections. (b) 3D view
of 3 DSA hard defective connections. (c) Vias are partially merged, so the
connection is in permanent closed state. (d) Vias are not merged, so the DSA
hard defective connection is in permanent opened state.
III. WEAK LEDPUF CONSTRUCTION
The proposed weak LEDPUF is composed of arrays of
SSUs. Each SSU is constructed from a DSA defective con-
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nection, which can be considered as random switches with
permanent states that determine the unique and stable function
of the circuit. Figure 4 (a) shows the implementation of a
SSU. Two ends of the DSA connection are connected to VDD
and GND through opposite switches. Figure 4 (b) shows the
abstraction of a SSU. In standby mode or before the evaluation,
the evaluation signal EVA is low and the output is zero. During
evaluation mode, EVA becomes high, and the output is either
one or zero depending on the permanent state of the DSA
connection. If the DSA connection is closed, the output is
one; otherwise, the output is zero.
Fig. 4. (a) Stable signal unit implementation. When EVA is high, the output
is either one or zero permanently depending on the state of the DSA via. (b)
Abstraction of a SSU.
The proposed weak LEDPUF is constructed by arranging
the SSUs in forms of arrays. Figure 5 illustrates a weak
LEDPUF with n rows and m columns, where the number
of SSUs is nm, and the number of CRPs is n. Since only one
of the rows is being evaluated at a time, a one-hot decoder is
used so that only one bit of the EVA vector is logic 1. The
challenge fed into the decoder is a log(n)-bit input, and the
response is a m-bit output.
Fig. 5. A weak LEDPUF with n challenges and m-bit response. Only one
bit of the EVA vector is logic 1 at a time.
Compared with existing weak SRAM PUFs, the weak
LEDPUF has several evident advantages:
• It is completely stable, so it has no area or latency
overhead. To generate a bit response, the weak LEDPUF
requires only one SSU and a transistor, or 3 transistors
equivalently, as for a standard SRAM cell, 6 transistors
are required. Once the state of the DSA via is determined,
the output is fixed permanently, so no additional ECC,
fuzzy extraction, or helper data is needed. As stated in
[35], for a SRAM PUF to generate a 128-bit response,
more than 4k SRAM cells are needed under a condi-
tion with 15% bit error probability. Therefore, the total
number of transistors needed for SRAM PUF to generate
a 128-bit response would be 24k, where for the weak
LEDPUF, only 384 transistors are needed, which is more
than 600x less than a SRAM PUF, thus the area is also
much smaller even assuming that the hardware cost of
the peripheral circuits are similar.
• In addition to model building attacks [36], the weak LED-
PUF is also more resistant to existing attacks to SRAM
PUFs, such as laser stimulation [37] or Photonic Emission
Analysis (PEA) [38]. The laser stimulation attack focuses
on retrieving the on/off state of transistors, but for weak
LEDPUF, the states of the transistors, which depend on
the EVA signal, do not reveal secret information. The
PEA attack does not work effectively because for each
SSU, the source voltage (VDD) of the NMOS is always
higher than the drain voltage, and the PMOS at the output
will not stay in saturation region since the output will be
pulled down even if the DSA connection is formed.
IV. GUESSWORK AS A UNIFIED FRAMEWORK FOR
EVALUATING THE LEVEL OF SECURITY
A. Why Consider Guesswork?
Consider the following game: Bob draws a sample x from
a random variable X , and an attacker Alice who does not
know x but knows the probability mass function PX (·), tries
to guess it. An oracle tells Alice whether her guess is right or
wrong. This is the situation where an attacker tries different
passwords to access an account.
If Alice has only one guess, then the optimal strategy that
maximizes her chance of guessing x successfully is choosing
the most probable x. In this case the chance of guessing x is
maxx′∈X PX
(
x
′
)
and the predictability of X is given by its
min-entropy [39]:
H∞ (PX) = − log2
(
max
x′∈X
PX
(
x
′))
. (1)
If Alice is allowed to make as many guesses as required
until she finds x, then the optimal strategy is guessing elements
in X based on their probabilities in ascending order [40]. It
has been shown that the average number of guesses it takes
Alice to find x (denoted by G (X) and termed guesswork)
is not given by the traditional Shannon entropy [40]. For
example, when drawing a random vector of length m, X ,
which is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with
distribution P = [p1, . . . , pn], the exponential growth rate of
the guesswork scales according to the Renyi entropy Hα (X)
with parameter α = 1/2 [40]:
lim
m→∞
1
m
log2 (E (G (X))) = H1/2 (P ) = 2·log2
(∑
i
p
1/2
i
)
(2)
where H 1
2
(P ) ≥ H (P ) with equality only for the uniform
probability mass function.
The security of a PUF is predicated by the inherent random
signature in the hardware. An attacker wants to either imper-
sonate a hardware by guessing its random signature, or to learn
it by eavesdropping. In order to impersonate the hardware,
the attacker needs to respond to a challenge with a correct
response. In order to evaluate the security of a PUF we connect
to the framework for password security [21]. For a dictionary
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attack, a guessing framework quantifies security through the
number of guesses the impersonator has to make in order to
identify the password (or inherent randomness) and therefore
respond correctly to all possible challenges. Therefore, we
quantify the level of security of a PUF through the number of
guesses required to break it.
In subsection IV-C we show that guesswork can serve as a
unified framework for evaluating and quantifying the security
of PUFs. Essentially, other measures of evaluating the level
of security such as min-entropy and mutual information are
special cases of guesswork. Furthermore, guesswork allows to
quantify the level of security under more elaborated scenarios
such as the security level when key stretching mechanism is
used [41] as well as when allowing an attack failure probability
(this problem is presented in Subsection IV-C).
Interestingly, characterizing the security of a PUF through
guesswork reveals a new interplay between the bias of a
PUF response, and the noise (due to instability) which is
incorporated in each sample. Guesswork is very sensitive to
the presence of instability, but yet is not very susceptible
to bias. These properties are discussed in subsection IV-E.
Therefore, guesswork highlights the advantage of stable PUFs
over unstable PUFs, when evaluated through the number of
guesses required to break a PUF. To the best of our knowledge
this advantage has not been reported in literature.
Moreover, we present a formal evaluation methodology for
PUFs security, while identifying the impact of bias, noise and
side-channels.
B. Background
The guesswork G (X) is a random variable that represents
the number of guesses required to guess a random variable x.
Therefore, the probability of having G (x) guesses is PX (x).
The ρth moment of guesswork is
E (G (X)
ρ
) =
∑
x
G (x)
ρ · pX (x) . (3)
The definition of guesswork can be extended to the case
where the attacker has a side information Y available. In
this case the average guesswork for Y = y is defined as
G (X|Y = y), and the ρth moment of G (X|Y ) is
E (G (X|Y )ρ) =
∑
y
E (G (X|Y = y)ρ) · pY (y) . (4)
Massey [42] noted that a dictionary attack minimizes the
expected number of guesses (i.e., guessing the values in the
decreasing order of PX (x)). Arikan [40] has bounded the ρth
moment of the optimal guesswork, G∗ (X|Y ), by
(1 + ln (M))
−ρ∑
y
(∑
x
PX,Y (x, y)
1
1+ρ
)1+ρ
≤
E (G∗ (X|Y )ρ) ≤
∑
y
(∑
x
PX,Y (x, y)
1
1+ρ
)1+ρ
(5)
where M = |X| is the cardinality of X . Furthermore, in [40]
it has been shown that when X and Y are i.i.d., the exponential
growth rate of the optimal guesswork is
lim
m→∞
1
m
log2 (E (G
∗ (X|Y )ρ)) = ρ ·H 1
1+ρ
(PX,Y (x, y))
(6)
where m is the size of X and Y , and
H 1
1+ρ
(PX,Y (x, y)) =
1
ρ
log2
∑
y
(∑
x
P (x, y)
1
1+ρ
)1+ρ
(7)
is Renyi’s conditional entropy of order 11+ρ [40].
Another extension of guesswork [43] considers a game in
which it is sufficient to guess x up to a certain level of
distortion D, according to some distance metric d (x, xˆ (i)) =∑m
i=1 d (xi, xˆ (i)). Essentially, when G (x) = i, the word xˆ (i)
is guessed such that d (x, xˆ (i)) ≤ m · D, that is, when the
attacker guesses a word which is within a Hamming distance
m ·D of x the game is over. The authors in [43] have solved
this problem for the general case; more specifically, for a
binary source which is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(p) and Hamming
distortion
d (xj , xˆj) =
{
1 xj = xˆj
0 xj 6= xˆj (8)
where 1 ≤ j ≤ m, they have shown that the exponential
growth rate of the guesswork equals
lim
m→∞
1
m
log2 (E (G
∗ (X,D)ρ)) = ρ · E (D, p) =
max
(
ρH 1
1+ρ
(p)− ρ ·H (D) , 0
)
(9)
where H (D) = −D log2 (D)− (1−D) log2 (1−D) is the
binary Shannon entropy [44].
Guesswork has been analyzed in many other scenarios such
as guessing under source uncertainty with and without side
information [45], [46], using guesswork to lower bound the
complexity of sequential decoding [40], guesswork for Markov
chains [47], and guesswork for multi-user systems [48].
C. Extending Guesswork
In this subsection we extend the definition of guesswork and
show that it can serve as a unified framework for evaluating
the level of security of PUFs by incorporating noise and bias.
In addition, we relate guesswork to other measures such as
mutual information and min-entropy.
We begin by finding the moments of the guesswork of a
noisy weak PUF.
Theorem 1. When the response of a weak PUF is noisy such
that the noise is additive and drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(D), and
the original response is i.i.d. Bernoulli(p) , the ρth moment of
the guesswork increases at rate ρ ·E (D, p) as defined in (9).
Proof: The idea behind the proof is that guessing within
Hamming distance m ·D of the original response, enables the
attacker to find the original response by using the helper-data.
Essentially there are two options. The first possibility is to
construct a code to guess the original response up to Hamming
distance m ·D as is done in [43], and then use the helper-data
in order to find the original response, in which case the rate
of the ρth moment is ρ ·E (D, p). The second possibility is to
use the helper data (e.g., the coset of an ECC) to guess over a
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subset. In this case, since the helper-data breaks up the space
into subspaces of size 2(1−H(D))·m [44], guessing through the
subspace can only bring the rate of the ρth moment down to
ρ · E (D, p). Therefore, the minimal rate is ρ · E (D, ρ).
Before we present a new game that extends the traditional
definition of guesswork, let us define the type of a vector.
Definition 1. Consider a binary vector x of size m and assume
that N (x|1) is the number of elements of this vector that are
equal to 1. In this case when N (x|1) /m = q the vector x is
of type q.
We now define a new guessing game that captures different
measures for evaluating the level of security.
Definition 2 (Guesswork under attack failure constraint).
Consider the following game: Bob draws a vector x of size
m i.i.d. Bernoulli(p). The attacker Alice has to guess x up
to Hamming distance m · D as defined in subsection IV-B,
under the constraint that the probability of attack failure is
smaller than or equal to 2−α·m where α ≥ 0, that is, Alice may
decrease the number of guesses by guessing only a subset of all
possible words, which leads in turn to a certain probability
of attack failure. We define the optimal guesswork for this
game as G∗ (X;D,α). Furthermore, we define the guesswork
in the case where the probability of attack failure is zero as
G∗ (X;D,∞) = G∗ (X;D).
Remark 1. The relation between G∗ (X;D,α) and previous
works is as follows:
• Pr (G∗ (X; 0,∞) = 1) = 2−m·H∞(p), that is, the min-
entropy.
• limm→∞ 1m log (E (G
∗ (X;D,∞)ρ)) = ρ · E (D, p) as
defined in (9).
The following theorem characterizes a lower bound for
G∗ (X;D,α) for any moment ρ > 0 in the case where the
attacker is allowed not to guess certain types.
Theorem 2.
limm→∞
1
m
log (E (G∗ (X;D,α = D (s||p))ρ))
≤
{
ρ ·
(
H 1
1+ρ
(p)−H (D)
)
s∗ ≤ s ≤ 1
ρ · (H (s)−H (D))−D (s||p) p < s ≤ s∗
0 ≤ D ≤ p ≤ 1/2, and
limm→∞
1
m
log (E (G∗ (X;D,∞)ρ))
= ρ ·
(
H 1
1+ρ
(p)−H (D)
)
where s∗ = p
(1+ρ)−1
p(1+ρ)−1+(1−p)(1+ρ)−1 , the probability of attack
failure decreases like 2−m·α,
D (s||p) = s · log2 (s/p) + (1− s) · log2 ((1− s) / (1− p))
is the Kullback-Leibler divergence [44], and Alice chooses a
set A = {q1, . . . , qL} of types whose vectors are not guessed,
such that the probability that N (x|1) /m ∈ A is smaller than
or equal to 2−α·m, that is, Alice guesses words in AC .
Proof: The proof is in Appendix A
Note that ρ ·H (s∗)−D (s∗||p) = ρ ·H 1
1+ρ
(p)
The next three remarks point out a few properties of
G∗ (X;D,α).
Remark 2. When an attacker attempts to break a very
large number of independent PUF responses (or pass-
words), where the probability of attack failure is 2−m·α,
he is very likely to break a fraction of 1 − 2−m·α of
the PUF responses (passwords), and this in turn leads to
average guesswork across PUF responses (passwords) that
increases at a rate limm→∞ 1m log (E (G
∗ (X;D,∞)ρ)) ≤
ρ ·
(
H 1
1+ρ
(p)−H (D)
)
= ρ · E (D, p), when D ≤ p.
Remark 3. When s = p +  the average guesswork is
approximately H (p) − H (D), which is the rate distortion
function of Hamming distortion [44].
Remark 4. Note that when p = 1/2 also s∗ =
1/2 and the upper bound of Theorem 2 is equal to
limm→∞ 1m log (E (G
∗ (X;D,∞)ρ)), that is, when guessing
according to the method presented in Theorem 2 Alice does
not gain anything from having a failure probability larger than
zero.
We now derive an expression for the min-entropy when the
attacker has to guess a word that is within Hamming distance
m·D of the password. In this case the min-entropy of a binary
i.i.d. source subject to Hamming distortion D is equivalent to
choosing a word which is in a ball of radius m · D around
the most likely word (i.e., the probability of guessing a word
which is in the most likely ball). The asymptotic value of the
min-entropy subject to distortion D is given by the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. Consider a binary word of length m for which each
element is drawn i.i.d. from Bernoulli(p). The min-entropy
subject to Hamming distortion D converges to
− lim
m→∞
1
m
log2
(
P ballX
)
=
{
D (D||p) 0 ≤ D ≤ p
0 p < D ≤ 1 (10)
where p ≤ 1/2, P ballX =
∑m·D
i=0
(
m
i
)
pi (1− p)m−i.
Proof: The proof is in Appendix B.
Remark 5. Note that the result of Lemma 1 can also be inter-
prested as Pr
(
G∗ (X; 0,∞) ≤ 2m·H(D)) when a password of
length m is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(p), where 0 ≤ D ≤ 1/2.
D. Examples for Quantifying the Security of PUFs
In this subsection we present a few examples that illustrate
how to use guesswork in order to quantify the level of security
of PUFs. We address evaluations for unstable PUFs as well
as for stable PUFs. We incorporate into the expressions noise,
bias, and side information coming from other PUFs or from
side channel/model attacks.
The first step in calculating the guesswork of a PUF is
evaluating the probability function according to which it is
drawn, as well as the noise level. In this subsection we assume
that the bits are i.i.d. for which case the first step is evaluating
the bias of the stable bits and then estimating the noise level of
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the unstable bits; evaluating the bias of the stable bits enables
us to state that the PUF response is drawn i.i.d. from the
probability function
P0 = p P1 = 1− p (11)
whereas the probability of transition of a bit when re-sampling
a PUF is q, such that
x(2) = x(1) ⊕ e (12)
where x(1), x(2) are the first and second samples of the
unstable (noisy) PUF, and Pr (ej = 1) = q, 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
For stable PUFs such as the one presented in this paper, it
is sufficient to calculate the bias and assign the probability
function to ρ · H 1
1+ρ
(P ) in equation (6), in order to get
the ρth moment of guesswork. For example, when the stable
PUF is drawn i.i.d. according to Bernoulli(0.47) the average
guesswork of a PUF of large enough size (m = 256, say) is
proportional to
2H1/2(0.47)·m = 20.9987·m (13)
whereas the largest guesswork that we can expect for is
achieved by an unbiased PUF for which each bit is drawn
i.i.d. Bernoulli(0.5), and is proportional to
2H1/2(0.5)·m = 2m. (14)
For unstable PUFs, re-sampling the PUF yields a noisy
version of the original response as presented in equation (12).
When the probability of transition is q, Theorem 1 shows us
that it is sufficient to guess the original response x(1) up to
Hamming distance m · q. The intra distance can be used to
evaluate the noise level. For example, when considering an
unbiased unstable PUF with a transition probability q = 0.1,
we get that the guesswork is proportional to
2m·(1−H(0.1)) = 20.531·m (15)
which means that noise decreases the average number of
guesses significantly.
The conditional guesswork (4) enables us to quantify the ef-
fect of side information on the security level of both stable and
unstable PUFs. In order to evaluate the conditional guesswork
we first need to characterize the conditional probability. The
conditional probability depends on the type of attack which
is being carried; in some cases characterizing its effect on the
randomness of the response requires some effort. A simple
example for a side information attack is one in which an
attacker has another PUF which is correlated with the original
one. For example, consider an unbiased stable PUF x for
which each element is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(0.5), and assume
that an attacker has another unbiased stable PUF, y, which is
correlated with x such that
P (y|x) = P (e) (16)
where e is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(0.2). In this case the uncon-
ditional guesswork G (X) is proportional to
2H1/2(1/2)·m = 2m (17)
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Fig. 6. The solid line presents the average guesswork of an unstable unbiased
PUF 1−H (D), whereas the dotted line is the average guesswork of a stable
biased PUF H1/2 (p).
whereas the conditional guesswork G (X|Y ) is proportional
to
2H1/2(0.2)m = 20.848·m (18)
because of the fact that in this case x given y is also drawn
i.i.d. Bernoulli(0.2). In general, the correlation between PUFs
can be evaluated through the inter distance.
Conditional guesswork subject to distortion enables to eval-
uate the guesswork of an unstable PUF when side information
is available. The method of evaluating the guesswork is similar
to the previously mentioned methods for evaluating conditional
guesswork and guesswork subject to distortion.
E. The Effect of Noise Vs. The Effect of a Bias
In this subsection we analyze the expressions for guesswork
as well as min-entropy subject to distortion, and quantify the
impact that noise and bias have on PUFs. Furthermore, we
show that the effect of noise is far worse than the effect of
bias in terms of average guesswork.
First, let us focus on the effect of noise and bias on the
expected value of the guesswork (i.e., the case where ρ = 1).
From Theorem 1 we get that when the transition probability
is D, the asymptotic growth rate of the expected value of the
guesswork is
H1/2 (PX)−H (D) . (19)
On the other hand the asymptotic growth rate of the expected
value of the guesswork of a stable PUF whose bits are drawn
i.i.d. from Bernoulli(p) is
H1/2 (p) = 2 · log2
(√
p+
√
1− p
)
. (20)
The first derivative of equation (19) equals
log2 (D)− log2 (1−D) (21)
which diverges as D approaches 0. Therefore, even when the
noise level (and D) is very small, it decreases the expected
value significantly. On the other hand the first derivative of
(20) is equal to zero at p = 1/2 (i.e., when there is no bias).
The first derivative around p = 1/2 is very small and therefore
bias does not affect the guesswork as much as noise. Figure 6
presents the guesswork of an unstable unbiased PUF and the
guesswork of a stable biased PUF.
For example, the asymptotic exponential growth rate of
the guesswork of an unbiased (p = 1/2) unstable PUF with
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transition probability D = 0.1 (i.e., a 10% noise) is equal
to 0.53 which is the guesswork of a stable biased PUF with
p = 0.05 (i.e., a 95% bias).
In terms of min-entropy as presented in Lemma 1,
the divergence D (D||p) = −H (D) − D log2 (p) −
(1−D) log2 (1− p) and therefore its first derivative also
diverge as D goes to zero. Therefore, min-entropy is also very
sensitive to the presence of noise. On the other hand, the min-
entropy of a stable PUF is equal to
−m log2 (1− p) . (22)
The first derivative of (22) equals m1−p when 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2 and
therefore it does not diverge. Hence, the effect of bias on the
min-entropy is also less significant than the effect of noise.
For example, the asymptotic min-entropy of an unbiased
(p = 1/2) unstable PUF with transition probability D = 0.1
is equal to 1−H (0.1) = 0.53 which is the min-entropy of a
stable biased PUF with p = 0.31 (i.e., a bias level of 69%).
Note that in general the first derivative of the min-entropy
does not equal to zero at p = 1/2, and therefore bias has a
stronger effect on min-entropy than on average guesswork.
Figure IV-E presents the behavior of the min-entropy as a
function of p. It shows that it is more sensitive to bias than
H1/2 (p).
V. EVALUATING THE SECURITY LEVEL OF WEAK PUFS
THROUGH GUESSWORK
A. Evaluation of Weak LEDPUF
We evaluate the probability mass function of a bit generated
by a weak LEDPUF based on simulation results for the
formation of connections
pX (1) = 0.4626 pX (0) = 0.5374. (23)
The uniqueness is evaluated by calculating the fractional
inter-distance [6] of 1000 weak LEDPUFs, each produces 512
bits of response. The distribution is with mean=0.503 and stan-
dard deviation=0.02. Since the variance value is proportional
to the inverse of the length of the response, as the length of
the response increases the variance value goes to zero while
the mean value goes to 0.505.
B. Measurements of Noisy Weak PUFs
Two noisy silicon PUFs: SRAM PUF and RO PUF, are
measured at 20°C in our experiments. For the SRAM PUF,
responses from 10 commercial 45nm SOI test chips with 176k
byte of SRAM cells each are obtained. Every SRAM PUF is
measured 10 times. The RO PUF is implemented on 15 Altera
TABLE I
NOISY PUF MEASUREMENTS. ALL NUMBERS ARE PERCENTAGES.
intra-FHD inter-FHD Stability Bias LevelOne Zero
SRAM PUF 2.26 48.33 93.42 49.13 50.87
RO PUF 2.48 47.13 91.19 51.38 48.62
TABLE II
GROWTH RATE OF THE EXPECTED VALUE OF THE GUESSWORK. WHEN
THE KEY SIZE OF THE PUF IS 32, THE AVERAGE GUESSWORK OF THE
SRAM PUF IS PROPORTIONAL TO 232×0.8442 , AND THE AVERAGE
GUESSWORK OF THE LEDPUF IS PROPORTIONAL TO 232×0.9980 .
PUF Type SRAM RO at 20°C RO at 60°C LEDPUF
Growth rate 0.8442 0.8323 0.4706 0.9980
DE2-115 FPGA boards. To avoid correlated CRPs, 90 CRPs
are generated from the 91 ROs in each RO PUF. Each RO
PUF is measured 10 times.
The measurement results of noisy PUFs are summarized
in Table I. The intra-FHD and inter-FHD are given in the
second and third columns, respectively. Both PUFs show good
results of small intra-FHD and close to 50% inter-FHD. The
stability shown in the forth column gives the percentage of
stable bits through all 10 measurements, where a stable bit is
a bit that remains the same during all measurements. A 93%
stability for the SRAM PUF, for example, means that 7% of
the bits flip at least once during the 10 measurements. For
LEDPUF, the intra-FHD is 0% and the stability is 100%. The
bias level (percentages of ones and zeros) are given in the last
two columns.
For the RO PUF, in addition to the intra-FHD at 20°C, we
also compare the intra-FHD between 20°C and 60°C, which is
the reliability of the PUF if it is enrolled at 20°C but verified at
60°C. The results are presented in Figure 7. We can see that for
most PUFs, the averaged intra-FHD at the extreme temperature
is about 12%, which implies that conventional ECC margin
with error reduction techniques for the PUF would be required.
Fig. 7. Intra-FHD at extreme temperature variation for 15 RO PUFs.
For noisy SRAM PUF and RO PUF, the expected growth
rate is calculated by plugging the intra-FHD to equation (19).
The expected growth rate of weak LEDPUF is obtained by
applying the bit probabilities given in (23) to equation (20).
The results are summarized in Table III. We can see that
even though the weak LEDPUF is more biased than the
noisy PUFs, its guesswork growth rate is still higher than
noisy PUFs. For RO PUF at 60°C, the guesswork growth rate
becomes much worse compared with RO PUF at 20°C, which
implies quantitatively how insecure a PUF can become under
environmental variations.
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Fig. 8. A strong LEDPUF based on a keyed hash function (HMAC or
NMAC) and a weak LEDPUF.
VI. STRONG LEDPUF CONSTRUCTION AND GUESSWORK
ANALYSIS
A. The Construction of A Strong LEDPUF
One of the shortcomings of using memory-based PUFs for
CRPs, is the scaling of the hardware size as a function of the
number of CRPs [20]. In general, each channel response pair
requires a different set of circuits, and as a result the hardware
size is proportional to the number of CRPs. On the other hand
for strong PUFs the hardware size scales logarithmically as a
function of the number of CRPs.
In order to create a strong LEDPUF we consider a keyed
hash function along with a weak LEDPUF. The weak LEDPUF
response is used as a key for the keyed hash function. The
challenges serve as the input to the hash function, whereas
the response is the output of the keyed hash function. Figure
8 presents a strong LEFPUF based on a keyed hash function
and on a weak LEDPUF with N bits of input and L bits of
output.
It is important that the keyed hash function uses the key
in such a way that does not enable the attacker to predict
responses to unobserved challenges based on the observed
ones. Therefore, concatenating the key directly to the chal-
lenge, which is vulnerable to extension or collision attacks, is
not a good realization of the strong LEDPUF.
We create strong LEDPUF by using a weak LEDPUF as a
key for a keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC)
[49]. Any cryptographic hash function, such as SHA-1 or
SHA-2 can be used for HMAC. It is worth mentioning that
in [50] the authors also propose the use of PUFs with an
HMAC in a somewhat similar manner; however, they do not
take into consideration the overhead incurred by the instability
of parametric PUFs.
To give a rough estimation of the hardware implementation
cost of the strong LEDPUF, for a HMAC-SHA1, the imple-
mentation requires about 30k gates [51], and just the ECC
part, BCH for example, of a parametric PUF would require
same order of gates [17].
The level of security of a strong LEDPUF depends on the
underlying hash function and the quality of the weak LEDPUF
that serves as a key, whereas weak LEDPUFs rely solely on
the randomness in the manufacturing process.
For the simulation results, each strong LEDPUF consists of
a weak LEDPUF that provides 2x256 bits for the two initial
vectors (IV) of the nested hash, and each response is a 256-bit
stream because SHA-256 is used in the construction. The same
challenge is given to 1000 strong LEDPUFs, and the inter-
distance of the responses is a distribution with mean=0.500
and standard deviation=0.03.
To construct a strong LEDPUF, only the weak LEDPUF
can be used because of its 0% intra-distance. If other existing
weak PUFs with even small intra-distance are used, the intra-
distance of the strong LEDPUF would be increased dramati-
cally due to the avalanche effect. In other words, even a single
bit flip of the weak PUF can completely change the response of
the strong LEDPUF. Figure 9 (a) shows that the intra-distance
of the strong LEDPUF jumps from 0% to 50% as the number
of bit flips increases from zero to one.
Figure 9 (b) shows how the intra-distance of the strong
LEDPUF rises as the intra-distance of the weak PUF increases
in logarithmic scale. Since 2x256 bits of the IVs are from
the weak PUF, for a weak PUF with 0.1% intra-distance, the
probability that it generates a same 512-bit response twice is
about 60%, which translates to a roughly 20% intra-distance
of the strong LEDPUF. Therefore, only the weak LEDPUF
with a guaranteed 0% intra-distance can be used for the IV
generation.
Fig. 9. (a) A single bit flip from the weak PUF can induce a completely
different response of the strong LEDPUF due to the avalanche effect of the
hash function. (b) Intra-distance of the strong LEDPUF rises dramatically if
other weak PUFs with small intra-distances are used in the strong LEDPUF
construction.
B. The Guesswork of any Strong PUF
In this subsection we quantify the security of strong PUFs
in terms of the number of guesses required to break them.
Our results quantify the number of secure authentications
for which any strong PUF is good for. Furthermore, we
compare the guesswork of our proposed strong LEDPUF to
the guesswork of other strong PUFs that have been introduced
in the literature. Finally, to demonstrate the importance of
stability of a strong PUF, we show that the guesswork of a
stable XOR arbiter PUF is larger than the guesswork of noisy
ones, for the same number of observed CRPs.
We begin by defining the following game.
Definition 3. Consider a strong PUF, which is used by an
authentication scheme to authenticate n unique challenges
through observing their responses. The authentication problem
is defined as follows:
1) For each challenge the attacker has to guess with a
single response.
2) When the attacker does not guess correctly, it can mask
itself to receive a new challenge.
3) Once the attacker makes a correct guess it is authenti-
cated.
Remark 6. Note that when authenticating a strong PUF
through CRPs each challenge can be used only once. Fur-
thermore, the problem defined above captures a strict security
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requirement that the system is compromised once the attacker
manages to deceive the verifier.
Remark 7. When the attacker fails to guess any response
correctly the attack fails. When the number of challenges is
large we show that this event decays exponentially fast.
We now find the average guesswork of the game presented
in Definition 3 as well the probability that the number of
guesses is smaller than or equal to a certain number.
Theorem 3. The average guesswork of the authentication
problem presented in Definition 3 is
E (G) = 2−H∞(1)+
n∑
i=2
i·2−H∞(i)·
i−1∏
k=1
(
1− 2−H∞(k)
)
(24)
where 2−H∞(k) is the most probable response to the kth chal-
lenge either given that the guesses for challenges 1, . . . , k−1
were incorrect or given the previous k − 1 CRPs (these two
scenarios can lead to different min-entropy). Furthermore, the
probability that the number of guesses is smaller than or equal
to l is
Pr (G ∈ {1, . . . , l}) =
2−H∞(1) +
l∑
i=2
2−H∞(i)
i−1∏
j=1
(
1− 2−H∞(j)
)
Finally, the probability of attack failure is∏n
i=1
(
1− 2−H∞(i)).
Proof: Each response has a certain statistical profile based
on the previous CRPs. When the attacker knows this profile
the optimal strategy to minimize the number of guesses is to
guess the most probable one. This in turn leads to 2−H∞(i)
where H∞ (i) is the min-entropy given that either the previous
i−1 guesses were not correct or that the previous i−1 CRPs
were revealed to the attacker. The results of the theorem follow
directly from this argument.
Corollary 1. When the statistical profile does not change
across challenges we get that
E (G) = 2H∞ − (1− 2−H∞)n · (n+ 2H∞) (25)
and
Pr (G ∈ {1, . . . , l}) = 1− (1− 2−H∞)l . (26)
Remark 8. Note that the average guesswork (25) is equal to
E (G) = 2H∞ −  (27)
when n 1, where  1 decays exponentially fast.
Remark 9. When the attacker does not know the statistical
profile of the response (for instance when the structure is too
complex for him to infer it), all he can do is guess a response
uniformly, which leads in turn to H∞ = 1.
Furthermore, in some cases the attacker can infer the
statistical profile based on the structure of a strong PUF and
a set of CRPs that have been revealed to him (see [52, 53]
for attacks on arbiter PUFs, XOR arbiter PUFs, etc.).
C. Quantifying the Security of Specific Strong PUFs
In this subsection we quantify the level of security of various
strong PUFs in terms of their guesswork.
the result in (27) also applies to the case when an attacker
can observe multiple CRPs. For example model attacks over
strong PUFs [52, 53] enable attackers to accurately guess
responses based on previously observed CRPs. In terms of
guesswork it means that once an attacker observes a certain
set of CRPs, conditioned on the CRPs that have been revealed
so far, the most likely conditional probability can be very high.
The average guesswork in (27) allows us to quantify how
secure strong LEDPUF is compared to other strong PUFs from
the literature that are susceptible to model building attacks.
Strong LEDPUFs are based on HMAC, and so idealy an
attacker can not infer anything from observing CRPs in this
case. Therefore, when the number of bits at the output of a
strong LEDPUF is m, the average guesswork converges to 2m
after observing any amount of CRPs. Even when the key is
biased such that each bit is drawn Bernoulli(0.53) [32], the
average guesswork when HMAC is a strongly universal set
of hash functions [54], is 2− log2(0.53)·m = 20.91·m based on
(27).
On the other hand, in [52] it has been shown for various
noise-free PUF simulations such as arbiter PUFs, XOR arbiter
PUFs and Feed-Forward Arbiter PUFs that the prediction rate
varies between 97% and 99%, after observing a few hundreds
of thousands of CRPs and implementing a model building
attack. Essentially, this type of attacks achieve a prediction
rate, which is an estimation of the probability mass function of
the next response, conditioned on a certain set of CRPs. In [52]
it leads to conditional probability of at least 2log2(0.97)·m =
2−0.04·m when the prediction rate is 97%, and so the average
guesswork under this model building attack is achieved by
assigning this probability to the average guesswork in (27) in
which case we get 20.04·m. Note that when the prediction rate
is 99% the average guesswork is 2− log2(0.99)·m = 20.014·m;
therefore, when m = 256 we get that at 97% the PUF is
20.026×256 = 100 times more secure than at 99%.
Therefore, guesswork provides a unified framework for
comparing the level of security of different PUFs under
model building attacks. It can also be used as a means of
understanding what is the desired prediction rate for a model
based attack, and as a result how many challenge response
pairs should be observed.
Next, we compare the security of stable and noisy XOR
arbiter PUFs [52] under model based attacks in terms of the
number of guesses for which the probability of guessing the
correct response is 99%. We use equation (26) to derive the
results of this subsection.
The expression in (26) depends on the min-entropy, and so
for noisy PUFs we need to incorporate the effect of the noise
into the min-entropy. For this we use Lemma 1 in which the
min-entropy is extended to the noisy case. In Table III we
use guesswork to compare the security of stable XOR arbiter
PUFs to the one of noisy XOR arbiter PUFs with the same
number of XORs, under model based attacks. We assign the
prediction rates and noise levels reported in [52] to (26), and
find the number of guesses under model based attacks in which
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TABLE III
THE NUMBER OF GUESSES FOR WHICH THE PROBABILITY OF GUESSING
THE CORRECT RESPONSE IS LAGER THAN 99% WHEN m = 1024, FOR A
STABLE XOR ARBITER PUF (D = 0%), AND NOISY ONES, UNDER MODEL
BASED ATTACKS FOR WHICH 200 THOUSAND AND 500 THOUSAND CRPS
ARE OBSERVED. THE VALUES ARE BASED ON THE NOISE LEVELS AND
PREDICTION RATES REPORTED IN [52]. THE SECOND ROW PRESENTS
4-XORS, WHEREAS THE THIRD ROW PRESENTS 5-XORS.
CRPs (×103) D=0% D=2% D=5% D=10%
200 41 10 1 1
500 22 10 1 1
the verifier has to take into account the noise as the PUF
owner observes noisy responses. The table shows how much
more secure stable XOR arbiter PUFs are when compared
to the noisy versions under model based attacks. Essentially,
it shows how susceptible such arbiter-based strong PUF is
after observing a certain number of CRPs. In fact, when the
noise level is over 5%, the probability of guessing the correct
response up to the noise level is very close to one (about 1−
10−10), which means that this PUF is completely broken. This
is because the prediction rate of each bit as reported in [52]
is 97.34%, whereas the noise level is 5% and so the chance
that the guessed response is not within the noise level of the
original response is extremely small for reasonable values of
m. Therefore, guesswork enables us to incorporate the effect of
noise and model based attacks into one framework that allows
comparison between different PUFs and various scenarios.
D. Guesswork of Message Authentication Codes
When the secret of a strong PUF can be read once in a
secured and tamper-evident manner, it can serve as a message
authentication code. When a keyed hash function is used as a
message authentication code (MAC), ideally, a key chooses a
hash function from a strongly universal set of hash functions
[54], that is, the set of all possible hash functions with an
input of size N and an output of size L, where N ≥ L. In
this subsection we analyze the guesswork of MACs under the
theoretical assumption that the key chooses a hash function
from this set based on a mapping, f (·), from the set of all
possible keys to the strongly universal set of hash functions.
We begin by defining a guessing game for strong LEFPUFs.
Definition 4. Consider the following game: Bob draws a key
at random from a probability function PX (x), and an attacker
Alice who does not know x but knows the probability mass
function PX (·) and the mapping from the set of keys to the
set of hash functions, f (·), tries to guess the responses of
a dictionary of size 2N (i.e., to guess the responses of 2N
messages that may be sent). For each value among the set of
2N possible inputs, an oracle tells Alice whether her guess
is correct. When Alice guesses the right output, Bob proceeds
to the next message. The game ends when Alice guesses the
response for each and every message. We assume that Alice
has an unlimited computing power and so she knows the
mapping from the set of keys to the set of bins (i.e., for each
challenge she knows the underlying distribution of the bins);
however, she does not know the actual value of the key.
Remark 10. In this problem Alice tries to find the responses to
a set of messages that may be used by a user. After she breaks
these messages, she can impersonate as the user. Since these
messages may be used multiple times (e.g., popular words), she
can try to guess the response to each of the messages multiple
times as well. This is different from the problem presented in
subsection VI-B, where the attacker had a single guess for
each challenge.
The optimal strategy for minimizing the number of guesses
is minimizing the number of guesses for each message. This is
achieved by guessing for each message the bins starting from
the most probable bin to the least probable one.
The guesswork is the sum of the number of guesses across
all messages, and therefore is equal to
G (bins) = G (bin1) +
2N∑
k=2
G (bink|bin1, . . . , bink−1) . (28)
where G (bins) is the number of guesses required to find
the responses of all 2N messages, G (bin1) is the number of
guesses for the first message, and G (bink|bin1, . . . , bink−1)
is the number of guesses for the kth message given the bin
values for the first k − 1 messages. Note that
PBINS (bin1, . . . , bin2N ) = PBINS (f (x)) = PX (x) (29)
where f (·) is the mapping from keys to bins, which is a
bijection. Hence, the vector of bins and the key have the same
probability mass function.
By averaging we get that
(1 + L ln 2)
−1 ·
2H1/2(bin1) + 2N∑
k=2
2H1/2(bink|bink−1,...,bin1)

≤ E (G (bins)) ≤
2H1/2(bin1) +
2N∑
k=2
2H1/2(bink|bink−1,...,bin1).
Without loss of generality let us write the conditional sum
over the messages in (28) as
G (bins) =
2N∑
k=1
bink. (30)
Based on (30) we can state the following two theorems.
Theorem 4. When the key is i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2), the average
guesswork across all messages for any f (·), which is a
bijection, is
η = E (G (bins)) = 2N ·
(
2L + 1
2
)
(31)
and the probability of deviating from the mean value is upper
bounded by
Pr ((G (bins)− η) > α · η) ≤ exp
(
−α
2
8
2N
)
(32)
where α ≥ 0.
Proof: When the key is i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2), and f (·)
is a bijection, the bins {bin1, . . . , bin2N } are i.i.d. uniform.
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Therefore, the average guesswork of each bin is 2
L+1
2 , and
since there are 2N messages we get (31). Furthermore, the
probability function of G (bins) can be upper bounded by
using Azuma’s inequality [55]. The sum of the elements in
(30) is a Martingale (when subtracting the expected value) and
therefore the probability function can be bounded by Azuma’s
inequality
Pr ((G (bins)− η) > t) ≤ exp
(
− t
2
8 · 2N+2L
)
. (33)
Therefore, for t = α · η and α > 0 we get (32).
Equation (32) leads to a concentration result, showing that
as N increases, the probability of deviating from the average
guesswork goes to zero.
Theorem 5. When the key is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(p), where
0 < p ≤ 1/2, and f (·) is the identity function, that is,
(bin1, . . . , bin2N ) = x, the average guesswork increases like
E (G (bins)) = η = 2(N+L·H1/2(p)) (34)
and
Pr ((G (bins)− η) > α · η) ≤ exp
(
−α
2
8
2N−2L·(1−H1/2(p))
)
(35)
where α > 0.
Proof: When f (·) is the identity mapping,
bin1, . . . , bin2N are i.i.d. (regardless of the order of
messages). The rest of the proof follows along the same lines
as the proof of Theorem 4.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we propose the first stability-guaranteed PUF
that requires no stability enhancement techniques, where the
source of randomness is extracted from locally enhanced
DSA process. Detailed constructions of two LEDPUFs: the
weak LEDPUF and the strong LEDPUF, are presented. Inter-
distance measurements on the LEDPUFs show that both weak
and strong LEDPUFs are ideally unique. The area and latency
of the weak LEDPUF is much smaller than existing weak
PUFs because no error correcting schemes are needed. The
strong LEDPUF provides large CRP space because of its
cryptographic hash based structure. The weak LEDPUF used
in the strong LEDPUF construction cannot be replaced by
existing weak PUFs because an absolute 0% intra-distance is
required for the weak PUF to avoid the avalanche effect of the
strong LEDPUF. We quantify the level of security provided
by weak LEDPUF by calculating the expected guesswork
resulting from weak LEDPUFs empirical probability function;
the loss compared to a fair coin toss is negligible.
Furthermore, we develop a unified guesswork-based anal-
yses for PUFs. We show through guesswork analysis that
stability has a more severe impact on the PUF security than
biased responses. In addition, we analyze guesswork for three
new problems: Guesswork under probability of attack failure,
the guesswork of strong PUFs, and the guesswork of idealized
version of MACs.
Our ongoing work includes exploring other sources of
LEDPUF that are more resilient to invasive attacks, such as
Scan Electron Microscopy (SEM) or Transmission Electron
Microscopy (TEM).
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The proof relies on the method of types [44] as well as on
the following assumptions.
1) When α = D (s||p) and s > p the types for which
D (q||p) ≥ D (s||p) are p < s ≤ q ≤ 1 as well as any
0 ≤ q < p for which D (q||p) ≥ D (s||p).
2) Since the probability that a type is in A decays like
2−m·D(s||p), the conditional probability of drawing a
certain vector of type q given that q is not in A decreases
like 2−(H(q)+D(q||p))·m [44] (i.e., it decays at the same
rate as the original probability mass function).
3) When there are no constraints, the rate at which the
average guesswork of any moment increases, is the
solution to the following optimization problem
max
0≤q≤1
ρ ·H (q)−D (q||p) = ρ ·H1/(1+ρ) (p)
where ρ ·H (q)−D (q||p) is a concave function whose
maximum is at s∗.
First let us consider the case where D = 0. Since the rate at
which the conditional probability mass function decreases does
not change (as stated above), the average guesswork of any
moment is the solution to the following optimization problem.
max
q 6∈A
ρ ·H (q)−D (q||p) . (36)
When s∗ 6∈ A (i.e., when the attacker can guess s∗) which
occurs in the range s∗ ≤ s ≤ 1, the average guesswork does
not change although the probability of attack failure is no
longer zero. However, when p < s < s∗, s∗ ∈ A and since the
function is concave the solution to the optimization problem
is s, which is the closest element to s∗ among the elements
that are not in A.
In the case when D > 0 the proof follows along the same
lines as Theorem 1 in [43]. This is because the conditional
probability remains the same and therefore for the binary case
with Hamming distance, the problem can be reduced to the
following optimization problem
max
q 6∈A
(ρ ·H (q)−D (q||p))− ρ ·H (D) . (37)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The proof is based on the method of types [44]. We need
to find the exponential rate at which the sum
m·D∑
i=0
(
m
i
)
pi (1− p)m−i (38)
decreases. Let us define i = α · m. From the method of
types we know that the exponential growth rate of
(
m
α·m
)
is
H (α). On the other hand the rate at which pαm (1− p)(1−α)m
decreases is H (α) +D (α||p). We are interested in the most
dominant term in (38), and therefore we wish to find
min
0≤α≤D
D (α||p) . (39)
The solution to this optimization problem is the statement of
the lemma.
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